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Investor relations is the field of management that is concerned with the relationships between companies and investors, and 
as such involves a wide variety of information types, for example mandatory, voluntary, financial, non-financial, qualitative 
and quantitative. While South Africa has recently been ranked number one for the strength of its auditing and reporting 
standards for the seventh consecutive year (IRBA, 2016), investor relations as a wider and voluntary concept, is largely un-
researched in South Africa. The purpose of the study was to establish the determinants of Internet investor relations (IIR).  
 
The quality of IIR was measured for a sample of 85 JSE-listed companies using a measurement instrument that consists of 
346 attributes. From the literature, as discussed in the literature review, 15 company characteristics were identified that 
could explain IIR quality. Stepwise regression model-building was used to develop a regression model that best explains 
IIR quality.  
 
Company size, leverage, being audited by a big four audit company, JSE industry membership, free float and dual listing 
status were found statistically significant independent variables, explaining 68.76% of the variation in the dependent 
variable, IIR. Contributions to the body of knowledge, study limitations and the need for further research are discussed in 
the conclusion. 
 
Introduction 
 
Granting that several investor relations communication 
channels are available to companies, for example, 
presentations, media releases, Twitter, Facebook and 
corporate websites, the current study examines only one of 
these channels, namely the corporate website. While JSE-
listed companies are mandated by various standards, acts and 
codes to communicate specific information items to investors 
(e.g. the integrated annual report), the decision to use the 
corporate website as investor relations communication 
channel is voluntary in nature. This study defines Internet 
investor relations (IIR) as the use of the corporate website to 
enhance investor relations. 
 
The purpose of this study was to to establish the determinants 
of IIR. To date, studies examining JSE-listed companies have 
been limited to mere descriptive studies (Stainbank, 2000; 
Venter, 2002; Loxton, 2003; Barac, 2004; Nel & Baard, 2007; 
Esterhyse & Wingard, 2016). 
 
The current study used a measurement instrument that 
consists of 346 attributes to measure IIR. More specifically, 
                                           
# The editor thanks prof N Wesson who has acted as editor for this article. 
1 For example, the average number of hours needed in the current study to 
measure the IIR per company was seven hours. 
quality is measured by first of all measuring content as widely 
as possible, by measuring the presentation of information 
(accessibility, timeliness and navigation), and, finally, by 
allowing for the measurement of attributes as only partially 
available (scored as 0.5) based on breadth, timeliness and 
usability. For a detailed discussion of this measurement 
instrument, see Nel and Brummer (2016).  
 
Given the labour-intensity1 of using such a measurement 
instrument, a sample of 25% of JSE-listed companies2 was 
selected using stratified (JSE industry) random sampling with 
proportionate allocation. A total of 85 companies were 
included in the sample. All IIR measurements were done from 
March to September 2015.  
 
It was found that larger companies, companies with more 
debt, companies that are audited by a big four audit company, 
companies with a higher free-float percentage and, lastly, 
companies that were dual-listed had higher IIR scores. 
Companies that were members of one of the following four 
JSE industries, namely consumer services, consumer goods, 
financials, and technology, each had a lower IIR score 
2 The population was defined as all companies listed on the JSE as on 30 
September 2014, that had not been suspended, had traded since inception 
date, had published 2013 annual reports, and had a dedicated, working 
website.  
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compared to companies listed in one of the other nine 
industries. 
 
The remainder of this article is divided into four sections: a 
literature review, methodology, results and finally, 
conclusions are drawn and further research avenues 
proposed. 
 
Literature review 
 
The literature can be categorised as descriptive, determinant 
or effect studies. Descriptive studies measure and describe the 
use of the corporate website as communication channel.  
Determinant and effect studies, on the other hand, explore 
respectively the determinants and the consequences (effect) 
of the use of the corporate website. Determinant and effect 
studies can be further classified in terms of the proxy used for 
disclosure, i.e. indirect proxy that is not based on an 
examination of the original disclosure vehicle or a direct 
disclosure proxy. Direct disclosure proxy studies as such, can 
be classified in terms of the disclosure medium studied (e.g. 
an annual report or corporate website). It should further be 
noted that not all prior studies that have examined the use of 
the corporate website as communication channel have 
explicitly measured investor relations. This section discusses 
variables that were tested in the literature as independent 
variables to explain variations in disclosure levels.  
 
Company size  
 
Company size is the most widely used variable in the 
literature to explain disclosure levels (Celik, Ecer & 
Karabacak, 2006: 107). With a few exceptions, almost all 
studies show a significant positive relationship between size 
and disclosure (both annual report and corporate websites).  
Celik et al. (2006: 108) and Marston and Polei (2004: 293) 
argue that larger companies are more complex and have 
higher information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders, that motivate them to disclosure more 
information than smaller companies. The political cost 
hypothesis predicts that larger companies have a stronger 
motivation to improve corporate reputation and public image, 
as they are more publicly visible (Celik et al., 2010: 108) and 
attract the attention of government bodies (Debreceny, Gray 
& Rahman, 2002). 
 
Larger companies are further expected to disclose more 
information, given the assumption that the relative costs of 
information production are lower for larger companies 
(Marston & Polei, 2004: 294; Bollen, Hassink & Bozic, 2006: 
281; Trabelsi, Labelle & Dumontier, 2008; Ashbaugh, 
Johnstone & Warfield, 1999; Oyelere, Laswad & Fisher, 
2003) and as larger companies simply have more to disclose 
compared to smaller companies (Aly, Simon & Hussainey, 
2010: 185). 
 
Leverage  
 
Agency theory is often used to hypothesise a positive 
association between disclosure and leverage. Debreceny et al. 
(2002) argued that an increase in the debt-equity ratio creates 
agency costs and, according to Aly et al. (2010: 186), 
companies could voluntarily disclose information on 
corporate websites to allow creditors to constantly monitor 
the company in assessing the ability of the company to repay 
its debts.  
 
Xiao, Yang and Chow (2004: 209) noted that as the risk of 
default increases with leverage, lenders and shareholders 
would demand more information to assess the company’s 
health. Larrán and Giner (2002: 66) argued that by increasing 
disclosure levels, a company can reduce agency costs and the 
possible conflicts between shareholders and creditors.  
 
Research to date reports positive; negative; and no 
association between disclosure and leverage. Xiao et al. 
(2004: 215), Celik et al. (2006), and Ismail (2002) all reported 
a positive association. Cormier, Ledoux and Magnan (2009: 
8) reported a negative association. The following studies, 
however, reported no significant association: Aly et al. (2010: 
191), Bollen et al. (2006: 291), Debreceny et al. (2002), 
Froidevaux (2004), Almilia (2009: 95), Larrán and Giner 
(2002), and Oyelere et al. (2003). 
 
Current ratio  
 
Leverage and the current ratio are both risk measures, but 
where increased leverage is associated with increased risk, 
increase in the current ratio is associated with decreased risk. 
Oyelere et al. (2003) found a positive association, while Aly 
et al. (2010: 186), and Leventis and Weetman (2004: 240) 
found no significant association between disclosure and the 
current ratio. 
 
Financial performance  
 
Signalling theory can be used to hypothesise a positive 
association between disclosure and financial performance. 
Companies with good news are more likely to disclose more 
information compared to companies with bad news (Aly et 
al., 2010: 185). Profitable companies have an incentive to 
distinguish themselves from less successful companies in 
order to raise capital at the lowest possible price (Marston & 
Polei, 2004: 294). Lev and Penman (1990), and Ettredge, 
Richardson and Scholz (2002) pointed out that the absence of 
voluntary disclosure may be perceived as “bad news” about a 
company. Larrán and Giner (2002: 66) argued that increased 
disclosure associated with profitability could be seen as a 
mechanism to improve the image of the company, to secure 
directors’ job security and to improve their remuneration. 
 
Celik et al. (2006: 110), Aly et al. (2010: 185) and Trabelsi 
et al. (2008) pointed to the mixed results reported in the 
literature and listed research that found both positive and 
negative associations. Positive associations were reported by 
Froidevaux (2004), Celik et al. (2006), Aly et al. (2010) and 
Pirchegger and Wagenhofer (1999) (Austrian sample). 
 
On the other hand, Ashbaugh et al. (1999), Ettredge et al. 
(2002: 366), Marston and Polei (2004), Oyelere et al. (2003), 
S.Afr.J.Bus.Manage.2017,48(1) 57 
 
 
 
Pirchegger and Wagenhofer (1999) (German sample), Xiao 
et al. (2004: 215), Larrán and Giner (2002), Abdelsalam, 
Bryant and Street (2007), Bollen et al. (2006: 291), Cormier 
et al. (2009) and Leventis and Weetman (2004) all document 
no significant association between financial performance and 
disclosure. 
 
Market to book 
 
The market to book ratio compares the market’s valuation of 
a company to the book value of the company as reflected in 
its financial statements. Larrán and Giner (2002: 67) argued 
that as higher market-to-book ratios are associated with 
higher amounts of intangibles that is not recorded in the 
financial statements of companies, there will be a greater 
motivation for such companies to disclose more information 
to ensure that the company is properly valued. Celik et al. 
(2006: 110) state that companies with high growth prospects 
and large intangible assets have specific knowledge that is not 
effectively and efficiently transferable to investors through 
conventional accounting disclosures. 
 
Significant positive associations were reported by Cormier et 
al. (2009) and Orens, Aerts and Cormier (2010), as opposed 
to Bollen et al. (2006: 291) and Abdelsalam et al. (2007: 24) 
who reported significant negative associations. Froidevaux 
(2004), Celik et al. (2006), Trabelsi et al. (2008) and Larrán 
and Giner (2002), on the other hand, all reported no 
significant association between the market-to-book ratio and 
disclosure levels.  
 
Financing activities  
 
Cormier et al. (2009: 8) argued that companies that access 
capital markets on a continuous basis have more pressure to 
disclose relevant information more regularly, as investors and 
lenders dislike any unpleasant surprises. Cormier et al. (2009: 
16) documented a highly positive association at the 1% level 
between their measure of capital market reliance3 and web-
based performance disclosure.  
 
Trabelsi et al. (2008) also reported a significant positive 
association (although only at the 10% significance level) 
between their measure of financing activities4 and 
incremental5 voluntary website disclosure. Xiao et al. (2004), 
on the other hand, reported no significant association between 
their proxy for financing activities and the total disclosure 
score, and a not expected, significant negative association at 
the 5% level for a voluntary disclosure sub-category. 
 
Big four audit  
 
Xiao et al. (2004: 200) as well as Wang, O and Claiborne 
(2008: 18) argued that both agency and signalling theory 
support the hypothesis that increased levels of IIR are 
                                           
3 Dummy variable of one for year-to-year change of more than 20% in the 
debt to market value equity ratio. 
4 Dummy variable of one if any new debt/equity has been issued in the prior 
three years. 
expected for companies that are audited by one of the big four 
audit companies.  
 
Knowing that larger auditing companies usually demand 
more detailed disclosure, the engagement of a big four auditor 
is a signal to shareholders and the investment community of 
their acceptance of such demands. Xiao et al. (2004: 201) 
proposed that international audit companies are more likely 
to facilitate the use of innovative IIR practices. Larger audit 
companies further have more to lose from damage to their 
reputations and are therefore likely to call for more extensive 
disclosures. 
 
Xiao et al. (2004: 215) reported a positive association 
between audit quality and the level of voluntary disclosure 
via corporate websites, but no significant associations 
between the total disclosure score, content, presentation or 
mandatory scores. Aly et al. (2010: 187) cited research that 
reported, respectively, positive and no association between 
disclosure and being audited by a big four audit company. 
 
Industry  
 
Aly et al. (2010: 187) used signalling theory to explain an 
association between industry type and disclosure. If a 
company within an industry discloses less information 
compared to industry peers it may be interpreted as a signal 
that the company is hiding bad news. This trend of companies 
to disclose similar information as industry peers is often 
referred to in the literature as the ‘follower’s effect’ (e.g. 
Lybaert, 2002). 
 
Studies that have examined the corporate website as 
disclosure vehicle showed conflicting results. Abdelsalam et 
al. (2007), Pervan (2006), Lybaert (2002), Celik et al. (2006), 
Aly et al. (2010), Bonsón and Escobar (2002; 2006), 
Ettredge, Richardson and Scholz (2001), and Xiao et al. 
(2004: 202) all reported an association as opposed to Trabelsi 
et al. (2008), Larrán and Giner (2002), Geerings, Bollen and 
Hassink (2003), Oyelere et al. (2003) and Bollen et al. (2006), 
who reported no significant association. 
 
Listing status  
 
A foreign listing will extend the dispersion of shareholders 
and therefore increase information asymmetry (Bollen et al., 
2006: 278; Kang & Stulz, 1997). Disclosure can decrease 
these information asymmetries (Marston & Polei, 2004: 295; 
Debreceny et al., 2002). Extensive voluntary disclosure via 
corporate websites can also create the impression of greater 
transparency (Xiao et al., 2004: 201), which may be 
important for foreign investors. 
 
On another point, Cooke (1992) and Xiao et al. (2004) argued 
that companies with listings on a foreign stock exchange face 
additional disclosure requirements and would therefore 
5 Incremental disclosure was defined as disclosure additional to SEDAR (i.e. 
mandatory) disclosure requirements. 
58 S.Afr.J.Bus.Manage.2017,48(1) 
 
 
 
disclose more information than companies not subject to 
these additional requirements. Bollen et al. (2006: 278) 
emphasised that for companies to communicate with local 
and foreign stakeholders (e.g. customers, consumers, 
corporate partners or investors) a communication channel, 
such as the corporate website that can simultaneously provide 
identical information to all interested stakeholders, is needed. 
 
A number of studies to date have documented an association 
between disclosure (as measured via printed media, e.g. hard 
copy annual reports) and the number of listings or a listing on 
a US or UK stock exchange (Celik et al., 2006: 109). A 
positive association between corporate website disclosure 
and listing status was reported by Xiao et al. (2004), 
Debreceny et al. (2002), Bollen et al. (2006: 291) and Aly et 
al. (2010: 191). Oyelere et al. (2003), on the other hand, 
found no association between website disclosure and listing 
status. Ali (2010), as cited by Khan and Ismail (2012: 7), 
documented a positive association between listing age and 
website disclosure.  
 
Ownership  
 
Retail investors have less access to information compared to 
institutional investors that may obtain information more 
easily from internal sources within the company. According 
to Marston and Polei (2004: 294), it could be assumed that 
investors with relative smaller shareholdings will use 
corporate websites to gather company-specific information as 
other information sources may be more inaccessible than they 
are for the larger shareholders.  
 
According to Ho and Wong (2001) and Marston and Polei 
(2004: 294), agency theory dictated that in a dispersed 
ownership shareholder structure, companies will disclose 
more information to reduce agency cost and information 
asymmetry. Proxies such as the number of shareholders (e.g. 
Pervan, 2006) and free float percentage (e.g. Celik et al., 
2006) could be used to proxy for ownership dispersion.  
 
Some studies, however, developed a proxy to measure the 
opposite of shareholder dispersion, i.e. shareholder 
concentration. Orens et al. (2010) measured shareholder 
concentration as a dummy variable of one if companies had a 
single investor that had a 20% or more shareholding. 
Abdelsalam et al. (2007) used two proxies to measure 
shareholder concentration, namely the percentage of shares 
held by directors and the percentage of shares held by major 
shareholders.6  
 
Directors who are also shareholders will have to bear both the 
consequences and benefits of the quality of management. 
Abdelsalam et al. (2007: 9) argued that high levels of director 
shareholdings align the interest of management and 
shareholders, which, in turn, reduces the need for additional 
voluntary disclosure to reduce agency costs. 
 
According to Chau and Gray (2002) family-controlled 
companies have less motivation than companies that have 
wider ownership to disclose more information, given their 
relative weak demand for public disclosure. Trabelsi et al. 
(2008) argued that companies with a concentrated ownership 
may want to preserve that information advantage by not using 
disclosure channels such as corporate websites.  
 
Literature measuring disclosure using the printed media as 
disclosure vehicle reports conflicting results. For example, 
Chau and Gray (2002) found a positive association between 
ownership dispersion and voluntary disclosure compared to 
Raffournier (1995), who reported a non-significant 
relationship. 
 
More specifically, in regard to studies that measured 
corporate websites as disclosure vehicle, Orens et al. (2010) 
and Abdelsalam et al. (2007) reported significant negative 
associations between disclosure and ownership 
concentration, but Trabelsi et al. (2008) and Cormier et al. 
(2009) reported no similar significant associations.  
 
Regarding the association between disclosure and ownership 
dispersion, Bollen et al. (2006) reported a significant positive 
association from their univariate analysis, but reported no 
significant association following a multivariate analysis. 
Marston and Polei (2004) found a significant positive 
association for their 2000 sub-sample, but no significant 
association for their 2003 sub-sample from their multivariate 
analysis. Pervan (2006) reported a significant positive 
association for a Croatian sub-sample, but no significant 
association for a Slovene sub-sample. 
 
Method of statistical analysis 
 
For each company an IIR score was calculated by totalling 
the individual attribute scores. No weightings were assigned 
and the maximum available IIR score per company is 
therefore 346.  
 
Table 1 lists the independent variables used in the stepwise 
regression model-building, a brief description of how each 
variable was calculated, as well as the expected association 
with the dependent variable, IIR, based on the above literature 
review. 
 
  
                                           
6 Abdelsalam et al. (2007) defined major shareholders as all shareholders 
with a shareholding exceeding 5%. 
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Table 1: Independent variables - description and expected associations  
 
Variable Description Predicted 
direction 
Independent continuous variables 
Company size Average daily market capitalisation of all trading days from 1 December 2014 to 30 November 
2015 
+ 
Leverage Ratio between debt and assets  + 
Current ratio Ratio between current assets and current liabilities - 
Financial performance Ratio between profit to ordinary shareholders interest (ROE) + 
Market-to-book  Ratio between the share price and the book value of equity + 
Number of years listed Number of years listed as on the date the IIR of each company was measured + 
Director shareholding  The percentage direct and indirect, beneficial and non-beneficial shareholding of directors - 
Free float  Ratio between the total issued shares minus restricted shares to the total issued shares + 
Independent categorical variables 
Net issue of shares Dummy variable representing one if the company on net has issued shares in the preceding 12-
month period 
+ 
Net buy back of shares Dummy variable representing one if the company on net has bought back shares in the 
preceding 12-month period 
- 
Big four audit Dummy variable representing one if the company is audited by either PwC, KPMG, Deloitte 
& Touche or Ernst & Young 
+ 
JSE industry  JSE industry classification  + / - 
Dual listing Dummy variable representing one if the company is dually listed on the JSE and any other 
stock exchange 
+ 
Primary listing Dummy variable representing one if the company has a primary listing other than the JSE + 
Block ownership Dummy variable representing one if one shareholder has more than 20% of issued shares - 
 
All independent variables were captured from the INET BFA 
database, a reputable supplier of financial data in South 
Africa, with the exception of the audit variable that was 
captured from the audit report in the latest financial 
statements7 and the JSE industry, dual listing, primary listing, 
years listed and free float that were obtained directly from the 
JSE. 
 
Results 
 
IIR measurement results 
 
Figure 1 shows the variation in the IIR score over the 85 
companies. The minimum and maximum IIR scores are 13.5 
and 193.5 respectively, with 71% of scores falling between 
45 and 135, and only three scores in each of the lower and 
upper categories. The average IIR score is 98 and the median 
96.  
 
 
Figure 1:  Distribution of Internet investor relations 
scores over companies 
                                           
7 As available on 30 September 2015. 
From Figure 1, the following is evident: a significant cross-
sectional variation exists between the IIR scores of JSE-listed 
companies and none of the companies examined in this study 
achieved a 100% IIR score. 
 
The voluntary nature of IIR may be offered as an explanation 
of the evident cross-sectional variation. Pirchegger and 
Wagenhofer (1999: 391) argued that it is not obvious that 
companies would wish to achieve their maximum disclosure 
score, nor that users of their corporate websites would want 
the company to achieve the maximum score. According to 
Lybaert (2002: 220), companies trade off the benefits and 
costs of using corporate websites to communicate with 
investors, with various internal and external factors that can 
influence a company’s decision as to how much to invest in 
the development of an IIR presence. Further to the reasons 
offered by Pirchegger and Wagenhofer (1999) and Lybaert 
(2002), the following can be offered as possible reasons that 
none of the companies achieved a 100% IIR score: 
 
 The measurement instrument used aimed to measure as 
widely as possible and it may be argued that many 
attributes are only ‘nice to haves’, for example, E-reader 
(dynamic or interactive PDF documents), Excel 
downloads, and Webcasts, podcasts and transcripts of 
presentations; 
 Attributes may be deliberately ignored by companies, as 
they may argue that these attributes are readily available 
elsewhere (e.g. SENS (Stock Exchange News Service) 
and share price information) or are already included in 
their integrated annual report (e.g. shareholder 
information, company advisors, corporate governance, 
and corporate responsibility information); 
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 Some attributes may be viewed by companies as 
alternatives in the development of their corporate 
website, for example, the search function, sitemap and 
help function as navigation tool or the use of an e-mail 
alert service and RSS content feed to improve the 
timeliness of information communicated to investors; 
and 
 Finally, some attributes measured in this study, for 
example, dividend reinvestment plan, American 
Depository Receipt programme and information on listed 
debt instruments may not be applicable to all companies.  
 
Selected descriptive statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics are set out in Table 2. For three 
independent variables (market capitalisation, market-to-book 
ratio, and the number of years listed), the natural logarithm 
was used to reduce the skewness in the distribution of these 
variables. Statistics for these variables are presented prior to 
the natural logarithmic transformations, which were used in 
the stepwise regression analysis. 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics: Variables used to examine variations in IIR  
 
Panel A: Continuous independent variables 
 Average Min Quartile Max Standard 
deviation 
   Q1 Q2 Q3   
Size (ZAR’ 000 000) 49 409.17 38.67 584.88 6 247.90 25 944.84 1 411 045.16 169 730.55 
Leverage  0.45 0 0.28 0.40 0.61 1.21 0.25 
Current ratio 5.07 0.03 0.99 1.32 1.94 159.31 22.52 
Financial performance 
(ROE) 
11.03 -40.09 2.78 12.77 20.62 84.02 21.14 
Market-to-book  2.28 0.13 0.89 1.43 2.88 12.99 2.53 
Number of years listed 22.75 1.78 8.94 17.19 27.58 75.23 17.99 
Director shareholding (%) 13.88 0.00 0.10 2.87 23.13 81.79 20.47 
Free float (%) 59.70 2.50 36.00 60.00 87.00 100.00 28.63 
Panel B: Categorical independent variables 
 Yes (1) No (0) Total     
Net issue of shares 36 49 85     
Net buy back of shares 15 70 85     
Big four audit 61 24 85     
Dual listing 25 60 85     
Primary listing (other JSE) 14 71 85     
Block ownership 52 33 85     
Basic material industry 17 68 85     
Consumer goods industry 7 78 85     
Consumer services 
industry 
10 75 85     
Financial industry 21 64 85     
Healthcare industry 3 82 85     
Industrials industry 19 66 85     
Oil and gas industry 1 84 85     
Technology industry 4 81 85     
Telecommunications 
industry 
2 83 85     
Utilities industry 1 84 85     
The average leverage was 0.45. As this ratio was smaller than 
0.5, it showed that on average the assets of the sample 
companies were primarily financed through equity. Although 
the current ratio varied between as low as 0.03 to a maximum 
of 159.31, it should be noted that only three companies had a 
current ratio of more than 5. 
 
The average company was profitable, with an average return 
on equity (ROE) of just over 11%. As suggested by the 
average (11.03%) and the median (12.77%), ROE appears to 
be normally distributed. 
 
The average company was listed on the JSE for nearly 23 
years, with 25% of the companies listed for more than 27 
years and 25% listed for less than nine years. Twenty-five 
companies had a dual listing and 14 companies had only a 
secondary listing on the JSE. Regarding financing activities, 
36 companies on net issued shares during 2015, and 15 
companies on net bought back shares. 
 
On average, 13.88% of shares were held by directors. 
Directors’ shareholding varied significantly, with 25% of 
companies where directors had almost no shares (less than 
0.1% of issued shares) as opposed to 25% of companies 
where directors held about one quarter of issued shares. 
Similar variations were evident in an analysis of the 
distribution of the free float percentage. Of the 85 companies 
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in the sample, 52 had a single shareholder who owned more 
than 20% of the issued shares. 
 
Although, the majority of the companies were audited by 
PwC, KPMG, Deloitte & Touche or Ernst & Young, almost 
30% were audited by smaller audit companies. 
 
Correlation analysis 
 
Table 3 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between 
IIR and the independent variables examined. According to 
Table 3, company size, leverage, being audited by a big four 
audit company, having a dual listing, directors’ shareholding, 
free float and blockholder ownership are all statistically 
significantly correlated at the 5% or better level with IIR. All 
coefficients are as expected.  
 
Table 3: Correlation matrix: IIR and independent variables 
 
 Independent variable IIR 
Company size 0.65*** 
Leverage 0.37*** 
Current ratio -0.12 
Financial performance (ROE) 0.10 
Market-to-book value 0.12 
Net issue of shares 0.21* 
Net buy back of shares -0.09 
Big four audit 0.44*** 
JSE Industry - Basic material 0.06 
JSE Industry - Consumer goods -0.07 
JSE Industry - Consumer services -0.09 
JSE Industry - Financials -0.01 
JSE Industry - Healthcare 0.03 
JSE Industry - Industrials 0.01 
JSE Industry - Oil and gas 0.03 
JSE Industry - Technology -0.05 
JSE Industry - Telecommunications 0.22** 
JSE Industry - Utilities -0.08 
Dual listing 0.26** 
Primary listing 0.15 
Years listed 0.19* 
Director shareholding -0.30*** 
Free float 0.37*** 
Block ownership -0.27** 
*** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level and * = significant at the 10% level 
 
Table 4 shows Pearson correlation coefficients between 
independent variables. Only two correlations in Table 4 are 
significantly higher than 0.5. The correlation between the 
market-to-book ratio and the return on equity (0.54) and the 
correlation between dual listing and primary listing (0.69). 
The high correlation between dual listing and primary listing 
was expected as 14 of the 25 companies with a dual listing 
also have a primary listing other than the JSE.  
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Table 4: Correlation matrix: independent variables used to examine variations in IIR 
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CUR -0.02 -0.30** 1.00                      
ROE 0.41** 0.06 0.44** 1.00                     
MTB 0.49** 0.27** -0.07 0.54** 1.00                    
NET.ISS 0.41** -0.03 0.04 0.13 0.33** 1.00                   
NET.BB 0.02 0.01 -0.08 0.00 -0.02 -0.40** 1.00                  
AUDIT 0.42** 0.07 0.09 0.27** 0.14 0.11 -0.26** 1.00                 
BM -0.23** -0.25** 0.11 -0.25** -0.38** -0.25** 0.00 0.12 1.00                
CG 0.12 0.09 -0.05 0.02 0.14 0.00 -0.14 0.00 -0.15 1.00               
CS 0.16 0.19* -0.06 0.29** 0.49** 0.13 -0.17 0.23** -0.18* -0.11 1.00              
F 0.27** -0.06 0.09 0.17 0.08 0.23** 0.16 0.06 -0.29** -0.17 -0.21* 1.00             
H -0.01 0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.10 0.22** -0.09 -0.02 -0.10 -0.06 -0.07 -0.11 1.00            
I -0.23** 0.03 -0.08 -0.14 -0.22** -0.17 0.12 -0.29** -0.27** -0.16 -0.20* -0.31** -0.10 1.00           
OG -0.06 -0.08 -0.02 -0.24** -0.03 -0.09 -0.05 0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 1.00          
TEC -0.07 0.10 -0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.07 -0.08 -0.13 -0.04 -0.12 -0.02 1.00         
TEL 0.21* -0.01 -0.03 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.13 0.10 -0.08 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 -0.03 -0.08 -0.02 -0.03 1.00        
U -0.19* 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.15 -0.09 -0.05 -0.17 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 1.00       
LIST.D 0.20* -0.09 0.24** -0.10 -0.13 0.18 -0.10 0.18 0.32** -0.01 -0.16 0.11 -0.12 -0.35** 0.17 -0.02 0.07 0.17 1.00      
LIST.P 0.16 -0.03 0.15 -0.09 -0.12 0.20* -0.12 0.00 0.17 0.10 -0.16 0.19* -0.08 -0.24** -0.05 -0.10 -0.07 0.25** 0.69** 1.00     
LIST.Y 0.16 0.07 0.10 0.14 -0.02 -0.23** 0.16 0.31** 0.14 -0.03 0.15 -0.16 -0.06 -0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.08 -0.07 -0.37** 1.00    
DIR.SH -0.35** 0.00 0.04 -0.07 -0.08 -0.11 0.09 -0.25** -0.15 0.06 -0.09 -0.16 0.18 0.30** -0.07 0.06 -0.10 -0.07 -0.31** -0.17 -0.06 1.00   
F.FLT 0.39** 0.02 0.03 0.19* 0.03 0.20* -0.12 0.26** -0.06 -0.18* 0.13 0.09 -0.04 0.02 -0.14 0.05 0.09 -0.15 -0.05 -0.14 0.15 -0.39** 1.00  
20%.SH -0.34** -0.20* 0.12 -0.17 -0.33** -0.29** 0.12 -0.02 0.16 -0.02 -0.16 0.06 -0.11 -0.04 0.09 -0.05 -0.04 0.09 -0.07 -0.23** 0.21* 0.16 -0.32** 1.00 
** significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. Notes: SIZE (company size); LEV (leverage); CUR (current ratio); ROE (return on equity); MTB (market-to-book ratio); NET.ISS (net issue of shares); NET.BB (net buy back of shares); 
AUDIT (big four audit); BM (basic material); CG (consumer goods); CS (consumer services); F (financials); HC (healthcare); I (industrials); OG (oil and gas); TEC (technology); TEL (telecommunications); U (utilities); LIST.D (dual listing); 
LIST.P (primary listing); LIST.Y (years listed); D.SH (director shareholding percentage); F.FLT (free float percentage); 20%.SH (block ownership) 
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Regression estimation results 
 
Table 5 presents the result of the stepwise regression that was 
performed using the IIR score as dependent, and the 
independent variables as listed and described in Table 1.  
 
Table 5: Regression results 
 
 IIR   
𝛽0  -151.91*** 
Company size 9.69*** 
Leverage 51.66*** 
Big four audit 21.45*** 
JSE Industry - Consumer services -52.99*** 
JSE Industry – Consumer goods -37.92*** 
JSE Industry - Financials -32.16*** 
JSE Industry - Technology -21.89* 
Free float 20.18* 
Dual listing 10.79* 
Adjusted R²  68.76% 
F-value 21.55 
Durbin-Watson 2.26 
*** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; * significant 
at the 10% level 
 
As depicted in Table 5, company size, leverage, being audited 
by a big four audit company, JSE industry membership, free 
float, and dual listing are explanatory factors that explain the 
level of IIR. As expected, coefficients for company size, 
leverage and being audited by a big four audit company were 
positive.  
 
As discussed, almost all prior studies showed a significant 
positive association between disclosure and company size. 
Froidevaux (2004), Bollen et al. (2006) and Orens et al. 
(2010) all document a significant positive association 
between website disclosure and company size.  
 
Agency theory is often used in the literature as underlying 
theoretical foundation to hypothesise a positive association 
between disclosure and leverage (Debreceny et al., 2002; 
Xiao et al., 2004 and Larrán & Giner, 2002). As opposed to 
the association between disclosure and size, empirical 
research to date has produced mixed results on the association 
between disclosure and leverage. Following Xiao et al. 
(2004: 215) and Celik et al. (2006), this study provides further 
support for a positive association between website disclosure 
and leverage.  
 
Signalling theory and agency theory both support the 
hypothesis of a positive association between disclosure and 
being audited by a big four audit company. The positive 
association found in this study between IIR and being audited 
by a big four audit company do provide support for Xiao et 
al. (2004), Bonsón and Escobar (2002) and Wang et al. 
(2008). 
 
Companies tended to disclose information similar to that 
disclosed by their industry peers. More specifically, the 
results in Table 5 showed that lower IIR levels can be 
expected from companies categorised as constituents of the 
consumer goods, consumer services, financial, and 
technology JSE industries rather than other JSE industries.  
 
Also as expected, coefficients for the free float percentage 
and the dual-listed dummy variable were positive, but only 
statistically significant at the 10% level. Marston and Polei 
(2004) also found a significant positive association between 
free float and website disclosure for their 2000 sub-sample, 
but found no association for their 2003 sub-sample. A 
positive association between having a dual listing and website 
disclosure was reported by Xiao et al. (2004), Debreceny et 
al. (2002), Bollen et al. (2006: 291) and Aly et al. (2010: 
191). 
 
The magnitude of the reported adjusted R² of 68.76% 
compared favourably to studies such as Almilia (2009) that 
reported an adjusted R² of 47.6%; Leventis and Weetman 
(2004) (35.6%); Celik et al. (2006) (33%); Marston and Polei 
(2004) (61.7%); Trabelsi et al. (2008) (35.42%); Aly et al. 
(2010) (70%); Cormier et al. (2009) (27.9%); Ettredge et al. 
(2002) (17.5%); Bollen et al. (2006) (21.1%); Pervan (2006) 
(69%); Xiao et al. (2004) (11%); Abdelsalam et al. (2007) 
(35.8%); Larrán and Giner (2002) (33.2%), and Bonsón and 
Escobar (2006) (50%). 
 
A minimum tolerance value of 0.5 and a Durbin-Watson test 
statistic of 2.26 confirmed the absence of respectively 
multicollinearity and autocorrelation. All residuals were 
approximately normally distributed and no evidence of 
heteroscedasticity was found. 
 
Summary and conclusion 
 
The purpose of this study was to establish the determinants of 
IIR quality. IIR were measured for a sample of 85 companies 
using a measurement instrument that consists of 346 
attributes. Overall, the majority of companies did not use 
corporate websites optimally to communicate with investors.  
 
From the literature, the following company characteristics 
were identified that could explain variations in IIR levels: 
company size, leverage, the current ratio, financial 
performance (return on equity), market-to-book value, 
number of years listed, directors’ shareholding percentage, 
free float percentage, financing activities (i.e. issue or buy 
back of shares), auditors, industry membership, dual listing 
status, primary listing and the existence of block ownership. 
 
Stepwise regression was applied to develop a regression 
model that best explains variations in IIR levels, using the 
company characteristics listed in the paragraph above as 
independent variables and the IIR score per company as 
dependent variable. The following were found to be 
significant independent variables as determinants of IIR 
quality: company size, leverage, being audited by a big four 
audit company, JSE industry membership, free float 
percentage and dual listing status. 
 
More specifically, larger companies, companies with more 
debt, companies that are audited by a big four audit company, 
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companies with a higher free-float percentage (i.e. fewer 
restricted shares) and, lastly, companies that were dual-listed 
had higher IIR scores. Companies that were members of one 
of the following four JSE industries, namely consumer 
services, consumer goods, financials, and technology, each 
had a lower IIR score compared to companies listed in one of 
the other nine industries.  
 
An understanding of IIR is important for standard setters and 
regulatory bodies such as SAICA and the JSE. The results of 
the study specifically contribute to investor relations and 
accounting literature.  
 
Though the utmost care was taken in measuring corporate 
websites, it is possible that some attributes might have been 
overlooked, given the complexity (e.g. number of internal 
hyperlinks) and the variety of website layouts. Although it is 
admitted that not all attributes measured may be applicable to 
all companies, the measurement instrument used made no 
attempt to distinguish between companies with respect to the 
relevancy or not of such attributes. Future research should 
consider the calculation of a unique score per company by 
removing attributes which are not applicable for some 
companies, and then calculate their IIR using the lower score. 
 
Based on the investor recognition hypothesis (Merton, 1987), 
a well-developed investor relations strategy will increase 
company visibility, which in turn leads to increased share 
liquidity (Brown & Hillegeist, 2007). Economic theory links 
increased liquidity to the cost of capital through information 
asymmetry (Botosan, 2000). This warrants the need for future 
research to examine the association between IIR and 
information asymmetry and the cost of capital, using data 
from JSE listed companies. 
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